Viewing file:  stack-protector-7.c (1.04 KB) -rw-r--r--
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/* { dg-do compile } */
/* { dg-options "-fstack-protector-all -mstack-protector-guard=sysreg -mstack-protector-guard-offset=16 -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tpidr_el0 -O2" } */
void __attribute__ ((noipa))
f (void)
{
volatile int x;
asm volatile ("" :::
"x0", "x1", "x2", "x3", "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7",
"x8", "x9", "x10", "x11", "x12", "x13", "x14", "x15",
"x16", "x17", "x18", "x19", "x20", "x21", "x22", "x23",
"x24", "x25", "x26", "x27", "x28", "x30");
}
/* The register clobbers above should not generate any single LDRs or STRs;
all registers should be saved and restored in pairs. The only LDRs and
STRs should be therefore be those associated with the stack protector
tests themselves.
Make sure the address of the canary value (tpidr_el0 + 16) is not
spilled and reloaded, since that would give the attacker an opportunity
to change the canary value. */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times {\tmrs\t} 2 } } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times {\tstr\t} 1 } } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times {\tldr\t} 3 } } */
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